Attack carriers

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Overview of channels to deploy a (malicious) print job

Various channels like USB, LPD, IPP, SMB, or raw port 9100 printing can be used as carriers to deploy malicious print jobs. While it is possible the attack printing protocols themselves, most attacks discussed in this wiki are targeted for the PostScript and PJL interpreters. The payload is just routed by any of the printing channels. This is important to note because it means whenever the attacker can somehow ‘print’ she can attack and exploit those interpreters.

Attack the interpreters, not the printing channels

This fact makes it very harder for the blue team (network administrators, for example) to defend against printer attacks. Many devices even allow printing (and therefore exploitation) by uploading a raw file to the printer's FTP service or to a form on the embedded web server. To get an impression, an overview of printing channels supported by various printer models is given below.

Malicious print job deployment channels
Printer model LPD IPP Raw Web FTP SMB USB
HP LaserJet 1200
HP LaserJet 4200N
HP LaserJet 4250N
HP LaserJet P2015dn
HP LaserJet M2727nfs
HP LaserJet 3392 AiO
HP Color LaserJet CP1515n
Brother MFC-9120CN
Brother DCP-9045CDN
Lexmark X264dn
Lexmark E360dn
Lexmark C736dn
Dell 5130cdn
Dell 1720n
Dell 3110cn
Kyocera FS-C5200DN
Samsung CLX-3305W
Samsung MultiPress 6345N
Konica bizhub 20p
OKI MC342dn
Konica bizhub C454e

It must be noted that these are not the only possible attack scenarios. For example using social engineering to make a victim print a malicious document is not even covered in this wiki yet – neither are new methods to deploy (potentially malicious) print jobs like cloud printing or Web Bluetooth.

Attacker Models

A physical attacker has the capability to print documents from USB stick or via USB/parallel cable. An (wired or wireless) attacker connecting through a TCP/IP network can deploy print jobs over LPD, IPP, port 9100/tcp, FTP, SMB and the embedded web server. Under the assumption that no strong user authentication like smart card based access control or SSL client certificates is enforced, both attacker models do obviously have a channel to print which is the precondition for further attacks to be carried out. Both are certainly quite strong attacker models because they require direct access – either physical or logical – to the device. However, in penetration testing scenarios where sneaking into the building is not an option and the printer is not directly reachable over the internet, other deployment channels are required. In such cases, the victim's web browser can be used as a carrier for printer malware as discussed in cross-site printing.

Related articles: USB drive or cable, Port 9100 printing, Cross-site printing